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Title 
 
Kazakhstan:  
Modernising Government in the Context of Political Inertia. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Kazakhstan declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and joined the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. Since then it has witnessed a remarkable 
economic transformation under the leadership of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. 
Pursuing a policy of ‘economy first and then politics’, Kazakhstan is under growing 
pressure to engage in political reforms which include a modernisation agenda to improve 
public service provision. Recent constitutional reforms have received a lukewarm 
reaction from the international community which Kazakhstan is keen to become part of. 
At the same time a progressive agenda of public services reform is well under way rooted 
in new public management and a desire to become much more customer focussed in their 
orientation. This article examines the parallel themes of political reforms and public 
services modernisation in Kazakhstan. 
 
Points for practitioners 
 
This article offers two key points for practitioners. First, it describes the detail of public 
sector reforms taking place in a developing country which has secured its independence 
approximately 16 years ago and the significant progress since then. Second, it poses 
questions about the political context in which administrative reform can take place. Has 
the existence of a highly centralised and autocratic form of presidential leadership 
resulted in a top-down imperative which has helped the pace of public services 
modernisation in Kazakhstan?  
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Introduction 
The Republic of Kazakhstan is located in Central Asia bounded in the west by the 
Caspian Sea, in the north by Russia, in the east by China, and in the south by Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan. It is the second largest of the former Soviet Republics with a population 
of 15.4 million people. It is the largest country in Central Asia and one of the most 
sparsely populated in the world. Kazakhstan was formed as an autonomous Republic 
within the Russian Federation in August 1920 and became a Republic of the Soviet 
Union in 1936. The Supreme Soviet elected Nursultan Nazarbayev first Kazakh president 
in 1990 and declared state sovereignty. In December 1991 Nazarbayev won uncontested 
presidential elections (98% of the vote) and Kazakhstan declared its independence from 
the Soviet Union and joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In 1995, a 
referendum approved the extension of the President’s term of office until 2000, however 
he called an early election in January 1999 and was returned for a seven year term.  
The most recent Presidential elections were held in December 2005 when Nazarbayev 
won a third term with more than 90% of the vote. The elections attracted negative 
commentary from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
which claimed they had not met international standards, citing failings such as: campaign 
restrictions, interference at polling stations, multiple voting, pressure on voters, media 
bias, and restrictions on freedom of expression (Keesing, 2005). These claims were 
strongly contested by the Caspian Information Centre Election Observation Mission, led 
by the UK’s Lord Parkinson, which concluded that ‘at this election, Kazakhstan has taken 
a major step forward in becoming a full democracy’ (Parkinson et al, 2005). Zharmakhan 
Tuyakbayev of the opposition coalition, For a Just Kazakhstan, claimed the results were 
an unprecedented violation of the constitution and laws, accusing Nazarbayev of creating 
a totalitarian government.  President Nazarbayev, on the other hand, defended his record 
in government citing successes such as: dealing with the aftermath of Soviet-era nuclear 
testing and toxic waste dumping; building an independent country without violence or a 
split along ethnic or religious lines; and significant financial and economic reforms. The 
extent of Nazarbayev’s electoral victory suggests that few Kazakh people were willing to 
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risk their material gains, even for the sake of greater democracy, freedom of the press and 
a crackdown on corruption, all of which were promised by the opposition parties. 
Following independence in 1991, Kazakhstan engaged in a programme of economic 
reforms where prices were liberalized, trade distortions reduced, and small/medium-scale 
enterprises (SMEs) privatised. The treasury and budget processes were dramatically 
improved. More recently, a framework for public resource management was introduced 
which lays the foundation for a modern civil service. The creation of a National Fund (in 
2000) to save part of the revenues from oil and other extractive industries has been used 
to increase social spending and share the benefits of economic growth. Since 2000 the 
economy has shown significant signs of improvement with GDP annual growth in 2006 
at 10.6% (World Bank, 2007) and projected growth of 8% between 2008-12. The 
government is attempting to promote economic diversification in the non-oil sector. 
Diversification into labour-intensive sectors is necessary for growth in employment and 
incomes, as well as to reduce the economy’s vulnerability to swings in the price of oil. 
It is against this political and economic background that we consider politico-
administrative reforms in Kazakhstan, in particular recent constitutional changes and an 
extensive programme of public services modernization. This paper will outline the 
juxtaposition of a public sector reform programme in the context of political inertia, due 
largely to a highly centralized state dominated by an elite form of decision making.  It 
will examine the hypothesis (Larbi and Bangura, 2006: 282) that democratisation 
(particularly competitive politics) redefines the environment for public sector reforms by 
creating ‘the political space and opportunity for citizens to demand reforms or for some 
groups to voice concerns and/or oppose certain aspects of the reforms’. Specifically, the 
paper explores the relationship between democratisation and public management reforms 
in a post-Communist central Asian country.  
 
The empirical evidence for this paper is drawn from a number of sources. The European 
Commission supported public sector reform in Kazakhstan through the development of 
the Eurasian Civil Service Training Centre established in Astana. Under this project, the 
author was directly involved in developing and delivering academic modules for civil 
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servants across a number of ministries in Kazakhstan. Further European Commission 
funding was offered to support the development of performance standards in Kazakhstan. 
Data gathered through direct involvement in both these projects forms the substance of 
the arguments in this paper. In addition, the author interviewed a number of senior 
officials in Kazakhstan ministries on the constituents of the reform agenda, the 
implementation process and wider political developments. Although some information 
sources are managed by the State, there is an increasing degree of openness amongst a 
new generation of public officials in Kazakhstan. This is helped by their exposure to 
international education opportunities which are supported through a generously funded 
government scheme - the Bolashak programme. In-service officials who are successful in 
obtaining international qualifications are fast-tracked to senior positions in the civil 
service and oversee the ongoing public sector reform agenda. The paper begins by 
considering the literature on new public management and its application in 
developing/transitional countries. 
 
Public Management Reform 
 
New Public Management has undergone many iterations from its conception by 
Christopher Hood (1989) who described its principal themes as a shift away: from an 
emphasis on policy towards measurable performance; from reliance on traditional 
bureaucracies towards loosely coupled, quasi-autonomous units and competitively 
tendered services; from an emphasis on development and investment towards cost-
cutting; from classic command-and-control regulation toward self-regulation; and 
allowing managers greater ‘freedom to manage’ according to private sector corporate 
practice (summarised in Lynn, 2006: 107). With the passage of time, new public 
management has also been described as ‘a rather chameleon-like and paradoxical creature 
– something that springs up for different reasons in different places’ (Homburg, Pollitt, 
and van Thiel, 2007: 5). If this is true of developed countries, then it is even more 
apposite when discussing changes in the public sector within developing and transitional 
countries
2
.  
                                                 
2
 Where the precise boundaries exist between developing and transitional countries is unclear. Kazakhstan, 
for example, using the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) is classified as a ‘medium human 
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One such transitional country is Kazakhstan which has embarked on a public sector 
reform agenda under the rubric of its official development strategy Kazakhstan 2030.  
Have these reforms been guided by the wider trends in new public management or has 
Kazakhstan been judicious in the adoption or adaptation of a modernising agenda best 
suited to its economic, social and political circumstances?  Coombes (1998: 418), in 
examining reforms in Central and East European states (specifically Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Slovakia) following the collapse of communist regimes in the late 1980s, noted the 
‘pervasive and irresistible intervention’ of public authorities in the daily lives of its 
citizens. As a result, he argued that reform of public administration is more crucial in 
transitional states. Yet, in adopting administrative reforms from Western Europe in their 
quest for modernisation, the effect ‘could be less of a departure from past ills than their 
prolongation in somewhat different forms’ (Coombes, 1998: 422). The same argument is 
made by Verheijen (1998: 416) who poses the question whether new public management 
reforms are the ‘wrong medicine’ for Central and Eastern Europe and concludes that 
none of the main models applied in western Europe are suitable as a whole, advising 
decision makers in these states ‘to pick and choose from examples of good practice in 
OECD countries’. The problems associated with direct read-across of new public 
management reforms between Western Europe and CEE states are instructive when 
considering such transfer potential to the Commonwealth of Independent States.  
 
Theorising New Public Management 
The adoption or adaptation of new public management in developing/transitional 
countries is under-theorised and, where it is discussed, tends to be located in debates 
about public management in mature democracies and convergence towards a standard set 
of global managerial practices. Ferlie and Fitzgerald (2002) theorised public management 
reforms in the UK, using the health sector as a case study, by drawing on institutionalist 
theory (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1983, 1987; Hinings and Greenwood, 
1988; Greenwood and Hinings, 1993; Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald and Pettigrew, 1996).  
                                                                                                                                                 
development’ country and has a HDI of 0.794 ranked at 73rd out of 177 countries with available data 
(UNDP, 2007). 
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They argued there is an in-built tendency towards isomorphism in public sector 
organisations leading to stability and a high degree of resistance to change. As a result, 
organisations develop into ‘archetypes’ which comprise three elements: the formal 
structure; systems of decision making, and underlying interpretive schemas, which 
include core values, beliefs and ideology. From an institutionalist perspective, if there is 
to be transition in organisations then these three elements must change simultaneously, 
but such archetypical transition is unusual.  Ferlie and Fitzgerald argue that the UK has 
undergone an archetype shift from a previously dominant public administration archetype 
to a novel public management archetype and conclude that it is ‘a sustainable model’ 
which ‘has successfully reproduced itself’ (Ferlie and Fitzgerald, 2002: 352).  
 
Does institutionalist theory help to understand public management reform in 
developing/transitional countries? McCourt (2002: 234), reflecting on why there has been 
a ‘modest’ implementation of managerialism in developing countries, argues that inertia, 
as asserted in the institutionalist theory, provides only one explanation. For example 
where corruption is a real problem, as is often the case in developing countries, the old 
public administration model with its emphasis on financial probity is more appropriate. 
Importantly, McCourt (2002: 237) contends that a different explanation is needed as to 
why the status quo prevails, namely: ‘changes that been canvassed including new public 
management, are politically infeasible’.  There is therefore a ‘need to understand the 
political context in developing countries to understand why change is so difficult’. This 
includes an acknowledgement of the vested interests which support the status quo, typical 
of which is the presence of oligarchies in authoritarian regimes. McCourt (2002: 238) 
concludes that while institutionalist theory points to isomorphic change or convergence, 
there is an alternative explanation of ‘stasis… in which political and other factors arrest 
convergence’. Lack of movement to adopt managerialism in developing countries may, 
according to McCourt, ‘be as significant as movement towards convergence’. 
 
A more recent addition to the literature, complexity theory (Haynes, 2003; Mittleton-
Kelly, 2003), is emerging which argues that institutional theory offers a relatively static 
account of the implementation of public management reforms. Teisman and van Buuren 
(2007) suggest that if we focus on the dynamics of implementation processes, then 
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differences in the outcomes of new public management reforms can be better understood 
beyond the accepted explanatory dimensions of the reforms themselves and the 
institutional context in which they reside. They argue that the final shape of managerial 
reforms is not only context-specific but also process-specific, reflecting the dynamics of 
the implementation process. At the core of their argument is the claim that the 
implementation of public management reforms is a co-evolutionary rather than a linear 
process and ‘out of this co-evolutionary process, trajectory between different parts of the 
system (organisation, process, chain) and its environment, the concrete (but never 
definite) shape of the new public management reform emerges’ (Teisman and van 
Buuren, 2007: 183). This theoretical interpretation is offered in the context of managerial 
reforms in West European governments and remains unexplored in 
developing/transitional countries. The overriding conclusion from an analysis of 
managerialism in West European countries is that: 
 
 Reforms that constitute new public management are crafted, shaped, implemented 
and interpreted in specific institutional contexts. Although this line of 
argumentation is rather susceptible to oversimplification, it is at the same time 
attractive in the sense that it explains changes in scope, focus and speed of 
specific reforms in terms of the institutional context in which the reforms are 
implemented (Homburg, Pollitt and van Thiel, 2007: 5-6) 
 
Whilst these European scholars stress the importance of differences associated with type 
of reform, institutional context and co-evolving developments as likely influences which 
shape public management reforms, they also identify challenges for future research, one 
of which is to examine the starting points of reform. They suggest that ‘the institutional 
breeding ground moulds, shapes and reinforces particular elements of new public 
management reforms, and is therefore an important variable for meaningfully explaining 
how NPM reforms are shaped and crafted in various national settings’ (van Thiel, Pollitt 
and Homburg, 2007: 202). The starting point for managerial reforms in post-Communist 
states is particularly interesting in this respect and offers potential to explore whether 
their origins provide one explanation for the shape of reforms which have taken place and 
if there might be convergence or divergence in a cluster of states such as the CIS. 
Examining Kazakhstan as a case study in public management reform will provide an 
opportunity to examine this further. 
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A Global Model? 
 
Cross-country transfer raises a wider issue debated in the literature  as to the global 
nature of public management reform (Lane 2000, Kettl, 2005). Pollitt (2003: 38), for 
example, argues that while public management ideas ‘have had a wide influence’ and 
there are ‘certainly broad trends in ideas’, the interpretation and implementation of 
reforms have been patchy, messy, diverse and reversible. Mathiasen (2005) concurs by 
suggesting that ‘what is transferable’ has been part of the debate since the beginning of 
new public management because of its international nature. ‘The ‘‘under what 
conditions’’ question applies to the political and cultural context in which change take 
place’ (Mathiasen, 2005:667). The context-dependent nature of ‘what works’ in public 
management reforms has prompted commentary that few researchers go much beyond 
‘specifying the criteria that are important in particular contexts’ because of the absence of 
a robust theory of contexts (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 197).  Whilst recognising this 
limitation, Pollitt and Bouckaert offer ‘a model of influences on public management 
reform’ which shows interactions between: background socio-economic influences, 
political pressures and features of the administrative system itself. The model, they argue, 
allows for ‘considerable variation between countries… in the sense that each country has 
its own distinctive political and administrative system’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 37). 
The model derives its empirical evidence from Anglo-Saxon countries, continental 
European and some Nordic countries – no Central and East European countries or 
Commonwealth of Independent States were included at the first stage of its development. 
 
McLaughlin and Osborne (2002: 11-12) whilst acknowledging critics who questioned 
whether public management ‘could be deployed as a tool for comparative analysis let 
alone global reform prescriptions’ (Lynn, 1998; Kickert, 1997), went on to claim that 
new public management ‘does still stand as, at worst, one of the two dominating 
paradigms of public management across the world at the turn of the new millennium’.  
The breadth of this assertion which presumably encompassed countries as diverse as 
Australia, Canada and the UK to Sierra Leone and Mozambique (top and bottom of the 
UNDP human development index) is difficult to accept. Mathiasen (2005: 645), on the 
other hand, argues that ‘convergence has probably fulfilled its usefulness as a fruitful 
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basis for discussion’ and, in any case, public management is a ‘patchwork of practices, 
many of which existed before the broader concept was articulated’. Pollitt (2007: 24) 
adopts a mixed position when he argues that the evidence to support ‘a ‘strong’ version 
of convergence on the NPM model simply doesn’t exist because there is too much 
diversity, difference and rejection, but nevertheless there is evidence that many 
continental European countries ‘have made selective and limited use of certain of its 
elements or instruments’. 
 
Several scholars have specifically considered new public management as applied to 
developing and transitional countries (Schick, 1998; Batley, 1999; Polidano, 1999; 
Manning, 2001; McCourt, 2002; and Larbi, 2006). Larbi, for example, examined 
evidence of applying public management in developing countries under two broad 
strands – managerial improvement and organisational restructuring (e.g. performance 
standards and decentralisation) as a cluster of ideas; and markets and competition (e.g. 
purchaser/provider split, customer orientation and an emphasis on quality) as another 
group of reforms. His conclusions on managerialism in developing countries are 
equivocal:  
 While the New Public Management may not be a panacea for the problems of 
public sector management in developing countries, careful and selective 
adaptation of some elements to selected sectors and activities may be beneficial. 
Implementation needs to be sensitive to operational reality… It is now accepted 
that context does matter in the design of reforms (Larbi, 2006: 48). 
 
McCourt (2002: 234) claims that although there are significant instances of implementing 
new public management in developing countries, the extent of implementation is ‘modest 
and still in its infancy in many places.’ He refutes the notion that managerialism is a 
global paradigm and argues that where governments have tried to implement reforms, 
new public management practice ‘gets refracted through the prism’s of a particular 
country’s laws, cultures and political imperatives’ (McCourt, 2002: 234). McCourt 
concludes that what is needed is indigenous public management models better suited to 
developing countries.  
 
 12 
There is also evidence that although public management has had a significant influence 
on the design of reforms in developing countries ‘the actual implementation is rather thin 
on the ground and the outcomes are uncertain’ (Larbi and Bangura, 2006: 277). Drawing 
on research from attempts by several developing countries to introduce reform, Larbi and 
Bangura (2006) make several general observations, inter alia: 
 
 Some of the failures and weaknesses in reforming developing countries are due to 
lack of attention to politics and the process issues in the design, introduction, 
implementation and management of reforms. 
 It is important to understand who the key actors in the reform process are and 
their motivations – key actors include state elites (bureaucrats and politicians), 
interest groups (trade unions and civil society groups), and donors. 
 There is little known about the relationship between public sector reforms and the 
democratisation process with the latter often fragile in developing countries. 
 
It is to the latter that we now turn our attention by examining in some detail the parallel 
tracks of attempts to democratise Kazakhstan and at the same time introduce new public 
management reforms. 
Kazakhstan: phases of development 
Kazakhstan is a presidential republic initially modeled on the Constitution of the French 
Republic (1958). A presidential system of government is characterised by a constitutional 
and political separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of 
government. Executive power is thus vested in an independently elected president who is 
not directly accountable to, or removable by, the Assembly (Heywood, 1997). 
Kazakhstan favoured a presidential system of government as a necessary response to the 
economic and political crises which accompanied the collapse of the USSR. Presidential 
government provided the authority and leadership to tackle economic reforms as a 
priority and with the urgency needed to address the Soviet legacy. It was seen as a 
pragmatic approach to a crisis which demanded immediate and decisive actions. A 
limited process of change in the system of government had begun before independence 
with modifications to the Constitution of Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic proposed 
by the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet Union’s standing parliament). A law entitled ‘About 
the Establishment of the Post of President’ (April 1990) was intended to pave the way for 
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the national election of a President but the Supreme Soviet proved slow and ineffective in 
making the necessary transformation. The Declaration on State Independence of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan in 1991 was a legal, political and ideological turning point in the 
history of Kazakhstan and established the status of the President as head of state and the 
supreme executive and administrative authority (Ertysbaev, 2001). The presidential 
elections followed in the same year.  
The period 1991 – 1995, from independence until a new constitution was adopted, can be 
characterized as the first stage in the formation of Kazakhstan’s statehood. Tentative 
steps were taken towards political pluralism and limited democratic changes emerged. 
The overriding emphasis was to tackle economic recession and build a solid foundation 
for recovery by exploiting the country’s considerable mineral wealth. During this period, 
power and authority rested exclusively in the hands of the President and Executive. The 
rationale for such an approach was that political development and reform could not take 
place without a stable economy and good inter-ethnic relations – the so called ‘first 
economy, and then politics’ era. As one observer put it: 
 It was the President’s conscious decision to grant priority to economic 
transformation, moving political reform away to some indefinite future. The 
Parliament does not have any real power in Kazakhstan, so passing government 
dictated bills in both its chambers is not a difficult task… The authoritarian 
authorities in Kazakhstan have not only initiated economic changes, but they have 
become a guarantee for the country’s stability (Wolowska, 2004: 48) 
President Nazarbayev argued that evidence (unstated) has shown only when gross 
domestic product per capita is greater than US$6,000 can democracy become viable 
(Nazarbayev, 2007a). The basis of this assertion remains unclear but Kazakhstan has now 
exceeded this level – in 2007 its GDP per capita was US$ 6,669 (World Bank, 2007).  
The second phase in Kazakhstan’s development was the period 1995 – 2000 which 
witnessed not only significant economic transformation but also limited political 
improvements. A new constitution (1995) provided for a democratic, secular state and a 
presidential system of government. During this period the socio-economic strategy 
document Kazakhstan 2030: Prosperity, Security and Improvement of Welfare for 
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Kazakhstan Citizens was launched (1997) and became the template or master plan for 
progress towards a market economy. With an improving economy and political stability, 
international investors provided capital for the development of local industry resulting in 
an emerging middle class. An environment was evolving conducive to political pluralism, 
regular elections, a growing civil society and some diversity in the mass media. 
The most recent phase in the country’s development from 2001 onwards has consolidated 
Kazakhstan’s strong economic performance as a regional leader – GDP has doubled 
between 2000 and 2008. With the economy performing well, attention shifted to 
democratic reform aimed at improving public services, increased accountability, and 
transparency of executive bodies. A State Commission for the ‘Development of 
Democratic Reforms’ was established in March 2006 under the chair of the President and 
committed itself to a political reform agenda, the objectives of which were: 
 To make the liberal and democratic reforms in Kazakhstan systemic and 
irreversible by mobilizing the efforts of the Government and civil society 
institutions. 
 To ensure that the majority of the population embraces and adopts democratic 
traditions with a view to establishing society as a ‘consolidated democracy’, and 
to strengthen the social base of the reforms. 
 To achieve political reforms that represent a compromise among all the forces of 
society who have joined together to meet the challenges facing them  
(Abdykarimov, 2006).  
To date the State Commission has implemented a number of initiatives to enhance the 
political process in Kazakhstan: one third of the governors are elected in districts and 
regional centres instead of being appointed; a strategic framework for the development of 
civil society (covering the period 2006 – 2011) has been formulated and approved; and 
the Commission has made a significant contribution to drafting the law on local self-
government. Importantly, the State Commission prepared constitutional proposals on 
further political development. These included ideas to strengthen the authority of 
Parliament and other representative bodies, the promotion of local self-government, 
strengthening judicial and law-enforcement systems, developing civil society and 
political parties, and amending the Constitution in order to provide a legal base for 
effective democratisation.  
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In May 2007 the two chambers of Parliament unanimously endorsed the proposals 
emerging from the State Commission on Democratic Reforms, its ad hoc working group, 
and the associated amendments to Kazakhstan’s Constitution. The changes were signed 
into law by President Nazarbayev. Therein the State Commission supported the 
preservation of the presidential form of government but backed a redistribution of powers 
and responsibilities in favour of an enhanced role for Parliament. These changes imply a 
shift from a ‘presidential’ to a ‘presidential-parliamentary’ republic by increasing the 
legislature’s role. Importantly, the amended Constitution places a two-term limit on 
presidents with each term being reduced from seven years to five. However, President 
Nazarbayev is exempt from this change ‘in recognition of the historic role the first 
president has played in the establishment of our state, as one of the founders of our new 
independent Kazakhstan’ (Zhumabayev, 2007: 7). In effect, this permits Nazarbayev to 
be re-elected as many times as he chooses – his current tenure is due to end in 2012. The 
President will, under the changes, need to seek Parliament’s endorsement for his choice 
of Prime Minister. The role of the courts is enhanced. The package also increased the 
number of members in Parliament and provided for more seats in the lower house 
(Majilis) to be filled according to the proportion of votes won by political parties
3
. The 
Deputies will also have a greater say in picking regional governors (akims) who will see 
their terms reduced from five to four years. Constitutional changes increase the role of 
the Assembly of the People, a unique instrument to preserve the religious and ethnic 
peace and mutual tolerance of Kazakhstan’s multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society. 
The American ambassador praised the constitutional reforms package as ‘a good step 
forward’ (The Economist, May 2007:10).  
Opposition parties however question whether the reforms represent a real shift in power. 
Parliament, they claim, will continue to be an obedient tool of the President which 
rubber-stamps his decisions. Aidos Sarimov, a political analyst at the Altynbek 
Sarsenbayev Foundation, an opposition-linked think tank in Almaty, argued: ‘from now 
on, the President will be able to dissolve Parliament any time he wants. According to the 
new amendments, the President will also be able to disband local councils, which is 
                                                 
3
 The number of deputies of the Parliament will be increased to 154 people. This includes an increase by 30 
of Majilis representatives and 8 new senators. 
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totally undemocratic. If presidential powers were expanded by 15 points, parliamentary 
powers were uplifted by only five, which resulted in a further imbalance in Kazakhstan in 
favour of the President’ (Holley, 2007:7). Strengthening Parliament therefore poses little 
risk to the President and could be a way of retaining political influence after he steps 
down, according to his critics. Supporters of the constitutional reforms refute these 
criticisms and argue that both chambers of parliament have been strengthened in an 
evolutionary process to a presidential-parliamentary form of governance. 
In an effort to legitimize the constitutional changes President Nazarbayev called for an 
early dissolution of Parliament ahead of the official end of its legislative term in 2009 and 
elections took place on 18
th
 August 2007. Party candidates were voted in via a system of 
proportional representation with 98 Majilis seats to be shared out by those parties which 
could win more than 7% of votes. The remaining nine seats were reserved for 
representatives of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. The outcome of the 
elections was perhaps predictable. The party of Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev (Nur-
Otan) won a landslide 88% of the vote in the parliamentary elections, leaving the 
opposition with no seats. Neither the Social Democratic Party or its moderate rival Ak-
Zhol surpassed the 7% threshold for gaining seats, winning 4.6% and 3.3% of the votes 
respectively (the Kazakh opposition had previously held a single seat in Parliament). Nur 
Otan holds all 98 seats which were up for election. The OSCE report on the elections 
‘welcomed progress’ over previous elections, while saying ‘a number of international 
standards were not met’, particularly during the vote counting process. Consiglio Di 
Nino, a Canadian senator who led the OSCE’s monitoring team commented: 
‘notwithstanding the concerns contained in the OSCE report, I believe that these elections 
continue to move Kazakhstan forward in its evolution towards a democratic country’ (Di 
Nino, 2007:11). 
Elite decision making 
Despite public moves towards constitutional reform and greater democratization, 
Kazakhstan is dominated by a formal political elite and a highly centralised power base 
comprising the Administration of the President of Kazakhstan and key stakeholders 
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therein: the State Secretary, Head of Administration, and Security Council Secretary. 
Cummings (2005) argued that the elite system is a compelling factor behind the 
emergence and maintenance of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan. These factors include: 
 The strong control of institutions by the executive elite; obstacles to the 
emergence of oppositional movements through alternative institutional foci or 
incentives and also inhibiting the possibility of institutions playing an 
intermediary role; the associated absence of systemic cushions that would make it 
easier for oppositional members to exist outside the incumbent elite; a high degree 
of elite reshuffling preventing security of tenure; various attempts at the 
centralisation of recruitment, including through centre/region crossovers; a 
general attitudinal elite consensus in favour of top-down central control; and, a 
strategy of compartmentalisation which acts as a substitute for full-scale reform 
(Cummings, 2005: 140). 
The Administration of the President is the dominant centre of decision making in 
Kazakhstan but it operates within a triad involving the President, Cabinet of Ministers 
and the Security Council. Ministers exercise considerable autonomy over social and 
economic matters and hence are influential in the policy making process. The Security 
Council, chaired by the President, has more recently emerged as an organisation used by 
him to exert power over the state machinery and to purge corrupt officials. There have 
been high profile dismissals such as Kayrat Karibzhanov, President of the Kazakh 
Telecom joint-stock company, and all his team who were sacked by Security Council 
when it was revealed that his monthly wage was $365,000! Whilst the Administration of 
the President, Council of Ministers and Security Council represent the key formal actors 
in ‘administering the summit’, there are signs that their role in policy making and 
‘speaking the truth to power’ is being becoming less exclusive (Guy Peters, Rhodes and 
Wright, 2000). The importance of the role played by the State Commission on the 
Development of Democratic Reforms is a case in point.  Given the centrality of this 
Commission to the future political reform agenda of Kazakhstan, not least in the area of 
decentralization, it might have been expected to have drawn on established elites. In fact, 
whilst chaired by the President, its membership comprised speakers from both chambers 
of Parliament, leaders of registered political parties and public associations, members of 
parliament, government representatives and public figures (although the most outspoken 
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political leaders were not included). The Commission undertook its work in a widely 
consultative way arriving at a public consensus on the political modernization agenda.  
The formal structures and processes of decision making do not, of course, fully reflect the 
extent of political elitism in Kazakhstan which, like other post-Soviet countries tends to 
be personalised. Political elitism is compounded by the fact that Kazakh opposition 
parties are in disarray and fractured, offering no real alternative to the voting public. The 
social stability of Kazakhstan is based on the President’s personal power, rather than on 
institutions and procedures. His control of the distributive state has allowed him to 
continuously increase his popularity by providing substantial increases in pension 
benefits and civil service salaries. In the President’s annual address (28th February 2007) 
he announced a doubling of childcare benefits and raised the basic pension, with the 
promise that its level would equal 40% of the minimum cost of living. From January 
2007 salaries of civil and public servants have increased by 30%.  The changes suggested 
under the Constitution could be seen as part of the President’s preparations for a power 
transfer in 2012. He has said ‘it’s time we laid a legal basis to ensure the success of the 
liberal reforms that we have begun, to switch to a new balance of state and public 
interests, a new system of checks and balances’ (Nazarbayev, 2007b). Parliamentary 
elections in 2007 however produced a legislature without any opposition lawmakers. The 
personalized nature of the political elite has been played out in a very public way in 
Kazakhstan when President Nazarbayev ordered a criminal investigation into the alleged 
involvement of his son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev in the kidnapping of two bankers and fraud 
at Nurbank. Stripped of his property before being tried and divorced by his wife, Aliyev 
is now a political outcast. A second presidential daughter (Dinara) and her husband 
(Timur Kulibayev) now appear ascendant in the family dynasty.  
Governance and Administrative Reforms 
Modernising government has been a core element in efforts to reform the political 
process more generally. The aims of the public sector reform agenda are set within a long 
term vision for Kazakhstan outlined in the official development strategy Kazakhstan 
2030. The proposed administrative reforms are: 
 19 
 To increase the effectiveness of the government working collectively as a state 
organ and individually through the role of each minister. 
 To implement modern information technology and eliminate bureaucracy in 
government bodies. 
 To create an effective and optimal structure of state bodies. 
 To restrict state interventions in the economy. 
 
There has been encouraging progress made on some public sector reforms. Civil servants 
have access to career development opportunities, including funded study abroad, aimed at 
increasing their professional skills. Productivity and effectiveness measures are being 
introduced, linked to performance incentives and output measures for delivering higher 
quality public services. A new code of honour was introduced in 2005 demanding certain 
standards of ethical behaviour and stricter penalties/disciplinary procedures for officials 
found guilty of corruption. An e-government programme has been in place since 2006 to 
provide citizens with fast and reliable access to public services on-line. This has included 
the creation of a network of public electronic centres where people without direct access 
to the internet can avail of on-line services, examples of which are: filing tax returns and 
making tax payments, pension fund deductions, property registration, and setting up in 
business. To complement these developments, a growing number of one-stop-shops are 
in operation offering citizens access to a range of public sector information and services 
across several ministries. These have proved to be highly popular with citizens more used 
to being shunted from one public body to another by poorly motivated civil servants 
lacking in customer orientation. One-stop-shops already offer the potential to address 
corruption and criminality amongst officials. Reducing personal points of contact lessens 
opportunities for corrupt practices. The role of the state in providing public services is 
also under review. Public-private partnerships are developing as an alternative to state 
provision and the potential for NGOs delivering public services collaboratively with 
ministries or individually is evolving. These moves are part of a more general trend in 
opening up erstwhile state functions to the private sector in areas where the government 
believes they could be better delivered.  
 
One of the most recent and significant reforms to take place in Kazakhstan is the 
introduction of performance standards for public services. This development appears to 
 20 
have been ignored by analysts of public sector reform in developing countries. Verheijen 
and Dobrolyubova (2007: 205), for example, assert that Latvia, Lithunia and Russia are 
‘the only three post-Communist states that have sought to introduce comprehensive 
performance management systems in the public sector’. In fact, performance 
measurement in Kazakhstan is a central plank in their reform strategy aimed at improving 
the quality of public services. In January 2007 a Presidential decree entitled ‘Measures 
aimed at Modernising the Public Administration system in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ 
set out the main priorities as follows: 
 To improve the quality of public administration processes, procedures and public 
service provision. 
 To improve professional skills, efficiency and co-ordination of the state apparatus. 
 
A legislative framework was established to achieve these goals through amendments to 
the existing law on ‘administrative procedures’. This resulted in government resolutions 
to implement public service provision model standards and reglaments (or public service 
charters) for all government bodies. According to the decree, the introduction of service 
standards will be implemented alongside measures to improve the structure of 
government, the development of annual reporting systems, audit of the efficiency of the 
activity of government organisations at central and local levels, introduction of a 
performance rating system, and regular surveys of the public to evaluate public service 
quality (Shirokova, 2007). 
 
During 2006 service reglaments were piloted in four ministries (Health, Labour & Social 
Development, Justice and Finance) and two regions (Chimkent Oblast and Almaty City 
Akimat). Reglaments include information about the main principles of serving the public 
and key performance indicators on quality and accessibility of public services in a form 
and language accessible to service users. They also include explanatory information on 
filing a complaint in cases where a citizen is dissatisfied with the standard of public 
services on offer. Draft reglaments were developed for 33 pilot services in the four 
ministries and two regions above. By the end of 2007, 15 reglaments were adopted and 
published in the press or on the web-site of the Agency for the Civil Service, the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. Hence significant progress has been made on the introduction of 
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performance management. The main principles of public service provision (viz: 
timeliness, quality, accessibility, politeness and a complaints procedure) have been 
approved. Key performance indicators have been developed which measure these 
principles when applied to selected services in the pilot entities. Guidelines have been 
drawn up to assist in the development of service standards and the introduction of 
reglaments. In addition, officials from ministries, regional trainers and akimats have 
undergone training on the introduction of reglaments and performance indicators.  
 
Moving beyond the pilot services depends on embedding a system which supports the 
collection of good quality data. In other words, the success of the reglaments is dependent 
on the robust gathering, monitoring, control and validation of the data which underpins 
them. This involves several challenges for the public sector in Kazakhstan at this point in 
the modernisation process. Systems need to be put in place in all public sector 
organisations for collecting high quality performance measurement information. The data 
gathered to measure performance needs to be both internally and externally validated. 
The former is the role of internal auditors, still underdeveloped in Kazakhstan, and the 
latter a new independent Agency proposed within the Prime Minister’s Office. The 
performance of each public sector organisation will be reported annually, disseminated 
widely and made easily accessible to the general public. The annual report will include, 
inter alia, a table showing how well the organisation has achieved on its key performance 
indicators against targets set to improve the quality of services. The table will report on 
the five criteria: timeliness, quality, accessibility, politeness and complaints procedure. 
Alongside this, internal and external audit reports will provide the public with an 
assurance that any reported improvements (or deterioration) in performance is based on 
reliable and valid data. Kazakhstan has adapted a version of the UK’s comprehensive 
performance assessment (CPA) framework to report on the quality of public services 
performance data (see figure 1). The new Agency within the Prime Minister’s Office will 
develop a Kazakhstan-wide data base which will serve two purposes. First, it will 
develop league tables of comparable public sector bodies and publish the results. Second, 
it will become a benchmarking hub where organisations can share learning, disseminate 
good practice and compare their own performance with others. 
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Public Services: Performance Measurement 
Kazakhstan Model  
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the medium term, there are aspirations to create an incentive system regulated by the 
Agency both at the level of the best performing organisations and civil servants therein. 
This however demands embedding a robust system of performance management in the 
ways outlined above.  Experience elsewhere suggests this is difficult to achieve in 
practice. Verheijen and Dobrolyubova (2007: 214) refer to the vulnerability of 
performance-based management in circumstances where the final step of ‘translating 
overall performance objectives into individual performance targets and creating a sense 
of personal responsibility for results amongst civil servants, has not been completed’.  
Kazakhstan reformers are looking to embrace a wider more challenging national standard 
of customer service excellence in public services by adapting the UK Charter Mark 
scheme. To enable this to happen, investment is taking place in three broad areas. First, 
computerised information systems are being funded which gather performance and other 
management control data. Second, the audit function, both internal and external, is a 
central part of any performance management process. There is investment in training 
qualified auditors to oversee and validate improvements in public sector services. Third, 
training in performance measurement is taking place across various levels, from senior 
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managers charged with strategic responsibility through to those at the coal face whose job 
it is to deliver performance improvements. The intention is that each understands the 
importance of his/her contribution to more customer focused public services in 
Kazakhstan.  
 
The success of the reform agenda to date is captured in ‘worldwide governance 
indicators’ which report aggregate and individual governance indicators for 212 countries 
along six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political stability and the 
absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and 
control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007). The aggregate indicators 
combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents 
in industrial and developing countries. The individual data underlying the aggregate 
indicators are drawn from a diverse variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
government organisations, and international organisations. We consider the indicator 
‘government effectiveness’ here. Government effectiveness measures the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Drawing on the most recent 
data we present the effectiveness of Kazakhstan’s government by comparison to its 
nearest CIS neighbours: Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
(see figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Government Effectiveness
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Figure 2 shows the percentile rank of each of the six selected CIS countries measured in 
terms of government effectiveness. Percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries 
worldwide that rate below these countries. Higher values indicate better governance 
arrangements. In the case of Kazakhstan therefore, 33.6% of countries rate worse on 
government effectiveness and just over two-thirds of countries rate better. The more 
important observation here is the relative position of Kazakhstan to its nearest CIS 
neighbours which ranks a close second to Russia (at 37.9). Hence the government’s 
effectiveness is relatively high, by comparison, and testifies to the ongoing success of the 
public sector modernisation agenda in Kazakhstan.  
 
In summary, Kazakhstan has made significant progress in terms of public management 
reform, although much remains to be done and customer oriented public services are still 
some way off. That said, there are encouraging signs of progress along the following 
lines: 
 The state bureaucracy is being rationalised and attention focused on integrated 
service delivery (joined-up government). 
 A review of the pay and performance of civil servants has established the 
principle of an outputs-based system where the quality of services is paramount. 
 Allied to the above development is the adaptation of private sector quality 
standards (ISO) in some public services. 
 Corruption measures have been put in place to detect and punish public officials 
involved. 
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 Performance measurement, although at the early stages, has been embraced at the 
most senior level of the public sector and is seen as a key element in the 
modernisation of public services in Kazakhstan. 
 
Conclusions  
What conclusions can be drawn from this case study of Kazakhstan which has explored 
‘the little known relationship between public sector reforms and the democratisation  
process in developing countries’ (Larbi and Bangura, 2006:282)? They hypothesized that 
democratization defines in a positive and receptive way the environment for public sector 
reforms to take place. In fact, Kazakhstan as a case study demonstrates that political 
stability through autocratic rule has been a key explanatory variable in securing public 
management reforms. Because of the form of political leadership in Kazakhstan there is a 
central autocratic imperative to modernize public services with evidence of considerable 
progress along a number of lines. Key administrative reforms have taken place in anti-
corruption measures, a code of ethics for civil servants, streamlining of public sector 
organizations, and an overall reduction in the size of the civil service. There has been a 
huge investment in one-stop-shops in a very short period of time. Most recently, 
performance measurement and a customer service orientation offer the prospect of 
systemic changes in the way public services are delivered in Kazakhstan. The fact that 
the government has resolved to implement public service reglaments for all government 
bodies testifies to the significance of this reform and support for the modernization 
process more generally.  
Since independence, Kazakhstan has adopted a clear prioritization process: economic, 
political and public management reforms, respectively. Its economic success can be 
clearly evidenced. Political reforms aimed ostensibly at changing the balance of power 
away from a highly centralized executive in favour of the legislature have so far failed to 
create, in an amended constitution, an effective system of checks and balances. At the 
same time a progressive modernization agenda in public sector reform is ongoing. This 
agenda has drawn on international experiences in helping to create a customer focused 
public service and is being implemented largely through legislative instruments at a pace 
 26 
which is impressive given the starting point. The reform agenda has achieved 
considerable impetus and authority as a direct result of a top-down political imperative 
for change and accompanying local and international donor resources to implement the 
modernization of public services.  
Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2004) model of explanatory public management reform variables 
(interaction between: socio-economic forces, political system, elite decision making, and 
administrative system) could be applied to understand what has happened in Kazakhstan. 
We have described how Kazakhstan is an example of elite decision making writ large 
with a centralized power base and a strong economy located within a long-term 
implementation plan in the form of Kazakhstan 2030, updated yearly. But the main 
explanatory variable in Kazakhstan is political leadership. Verheijen (2003: 496) argued 
that convincing political leadership is the key condition for progress to be made and 
politicians need to be educated about the benefits of public management reforms ‘if a 
review of administrative reform in post-Communist states undertaken in the next 10 years 
time is to yield more than a few partial illustrations of success and a sometimes 
demoralizing large number of cases of reform failure’. Mathiasen (2005: 646) makes a 
similar point by suggesting that former communist countries ‘recognise that their 
inherited public management systems are incompatible with the responsiveness and 
transparency that are inherent in democratic systems’. Yet Bebbington and McCourt 
(2007: 18) claim that although leadership is frequently identified as a key explanation of 
development success, ‘political leadership is not well understood’ and we ‘lack an 
understanding of how much room political leaders have to manoeuvre in their political 
environments’. Nazarbayev appears, through his autocratic stewartship of a successful 
economy and political stability to have secured considerable manoeuverability in 
Kazakhstan.  
This contrasts starkly with his central Asian neighbours: the Kyrgyz Republic, whose 
political situation remains fragile and where there are many fragmented voices within 
government; Tajikistan, the poorest republic of the Soviet Union which has a tenuous 
legislative and fiscal framework, weak public administration, lacks basic infrastructure 
and is hugely corrupt; Turkmenistan, which consistently rejects the adoption of 
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democratic practices and exerts tight state control on all areas of activity; and Uzbekistan, 
whose political orientation has shifted from a western orientation in favour of Russia and 
China. It seems that the West European experience where ‘the institutional breeding 
ground moulds, shapes and reinforces particular elements of new public management 
reforms’ (van Thiel, Pollitt and Homburg, 2007: 202) has limited read-across in Central 
Asian countries. The communist origins of CIS countries appear to matter less than 
political autocracy and economic progress which have driven significant public 
management reforms in Kazakhstan. In short, there is evidence of divergence within CIS 
countries in their approach to public sector reforms. The political elite of Kazakhstan can 
point to their recent (November 2007) success in being offered the chair of the OSCE (in 
2010) as a political triumph in the face of patchy democratic credentials.  Kazakhstan has 
finally been accepted as an equal player in global affairs. Its ostensible attempts at 
democratization yet demonstrable progress in public management reforms must have 
played a part in its new found international status. The Kazakhstan example would seem 
to indicate that there is no pre-requisite association between democratization and 
successful public management reforms. 
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